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Statusi i Berlinit kish qen\u00eb nj\u00eb problem i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb p\u00ebr Aleat\u00ebt, q\u00eb nga koha e konferencave t\u00eb Jalt\u00ebs dhe Potsdamit n\u00eb 1945, at\u00ebher\u00eb kur \u201cTre t\u00eb M\u00ebdhenjt\u00eb\u201d (Britania e Madhe, Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Bashkimi Sovjetik) kishin r\u00ebn\u00eb dakord ta ndanin Gjermanin\u00eb e mundur, n\u00eb kat\u00ebr zona t\u00eb pushtuara. Ata ndan\u00eb gjithashtu edhe Berlinin, q\u00eb ndodhej 110 milje brenda zon\u00ebs sovjetike, n\u00eb kat\u00ebr sektor\u00eb, ku secili qeverisej nga nj\u00eb komandant ushtarak i ushtris\u00eb fituese respektive. Por, shum\u00eb shpejt mes aleat\u00ebve u pan\u00eb divergjenca n\u00eb lidhje me t\u00eb ardhmen e Gjermanis\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi, dhe t\u00eb Berlinit n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti. N\u00eb vend ta trajtonin Gjermanin\u00eb si nj\u00eb nj\u00ebsi ekonomike unike \u2013 si\u00e7 ishte vendosur n\u00eb Potsdam \u2013 Bashkimi Sovjetik e qeveriste zon\u00ebn sikur t\u00eb ish nj\u00eb nj\u00ebsi e pavarur, dhe ai kund\u00ebrshtoi menj\u00ebher\u00eb l\u00ebvizjet e per\u00ebndimor\u00ebve p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ribashkim gjerman sipas m\u00ebnyrave demokratike.<\/p>\n
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K\u00ebto mosmarr\u00ebveshje \u00e7uan n\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00ebn prej krizave t\u00eb Berlinit, kur n\u00eb mars 1948, Bashkimi Sovjetik shpalli nj\u00eb seri masash q\u00eb synon t\u00eb frenonin hyrjen n\u00eb Berlinin Per\u00ebndimor, gj\u00eb q\u00eb arriti kulmin me pezullimin e trafikut hekurudhor dhe rrugor n\u00eb 24 qershor. Arsyeja e pretenduar prej sovjetik\u00ebve p\u00ebr bllokad\u00ebn, ishte se kjo erdhi si reagim ndaj planeve p\u00ebr bashkim t\u00eb monedh\u00ebs n\u00eb sektorin per\u00ebndimor, por q\u00ebllimi i saj m\u00eb i thell\u00eb ishte t\u00eb testonte angazhimin e SHBA kundrejt Berlinit per\u00ebndimor. N\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigje, Presidenti Truman zbatoi kund\u00ebrsanksione ndaj Gjermanis\u00eb Lindore dhe nisi nj\u00eb operacion masiv, duke i d\u00ebrguar Berlinit Per\u00ebndimor furnizime nga ajri. N\u00eb muajt pasues u zhvilluan negociata t\u00eb kota diplomatike, por ura ajrore dhe kund\u00ebr-bllokada, b\u00ebri q\u00eb lidershipi sovjetik t\u00eb rishikonte strategjin\u00eb e vet dhe n\u00eb 4 maj 1949, pas nj\u00eb serie takimesh t\u00eb fsheht\u00eb t\u00eb ambasador\u00ebve t\u00eb tyre n\u00eb OKB, dy superfuqit\u00eb ran\u00eb dakord p\u00ebr nj\u00eb heqje t\u00eb nd\u00ebrsjell\u00eb t\u00eb kufizimeve.<\/p>\n
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Gjemb<\/p>\n
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Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, Berlini mbeti nj\u00eb gjemb n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet SHBA-BS, dhe n\u00eb dekad\u00ebn pasardh\u00ebse u vu re nj\u00eb izolim n\u00eb rritje i sektor\u00ebve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb dhe lindor\u00eb nga nj\u00ebri-tjetri. M\u00eb pas, krejt papritur n\u00eb 1958, kryeministri sovjetik Hrushov precipitopi kriz\u00ebn e dyt\u00eb t\u00eb Berlinit, kur k\u00ebrkoi q\u00eb t\u00eb negociohej nj\u00eb traktat formal paqeje, i cili do t\u00eb legjitimonte ndarjen e p\u00ebrhershme t\u00eb Gjermanis\u00eb dhe do ta transformonte Berlinin Per\u00ebndimor n\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201cqytet t\u00eb lir\u00eb e t\u00eb demilitarizuar\u201d. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, ai k\u00ebmb\u00ebnguli q\u00eb transformimi t\u00eb p\u00ebrfundohej brenda gjasht\u00eb muajve, p\u00ebrndryshe Bashkimi Sovjetik do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonte vet\u00eb nj\u00eb zgjidhje.<\/p>\n
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Presidenti Aizenhauer i hodhi posht\u00eb k\u00ebrkesat, duke theksuar se SHBA nuk njihnin regjimin gjermano-lindor dhe, si rrjedhim nuk do t\u00eb kryenin nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb ndar\u00eb me t\u00eb; si rrjedhim, rrug\u00ebt e aleat\u00ebve dhe aksesi p\u00ebr n\u00eb Berlin ende qeveriseshin prej marr\u00ebveshjeve t\u00eb firmosura n\u00eb fundin e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb. N\u00eb maj 1959, dy pal\u00ebt u takuan n\u00eb Gjenev\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur n\u00eb nj\u00eb kompromis. Sidoqoft\u00eb, nga takimi shkuan drejt nj\u00eb rruge pa krye. BS k\u00ebmb\u00ebnguli q\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtja e Berlinit duhej t\u00eb zgjidhej brenda 18 muajve t\u00eb ardhsh\u00ebm. Duket se sovjetik\u00ebt kishin parashikuar mund\u00ebsin\u00eb e ardhjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb presidenti t\u00eb ri, pa p\u00ebrvoj\u00eb, pas Aizenhauerit.<\/p>\n
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Pasi kishte lidhur prestigjin e tij personal me heqjen \u201ce k\u00ebsaj ashkle nga zemra e Evrop\u00ebs\u201d, Hrushovi p\u00ebrdori takimin e tij t\u00eb par\u00eb me Kenedin e sapozgjedhur, n\u00eb nj\u00eb samit t\u00eb qershorit 1961 n\u00eb Vien\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb rishpallur pozicionin e tij n\u00eb lidhje me Berlinin. Dit\u00ebn e dyt\u00eb, lideri sovjetik i tha Kenedit se nevojitej t\u2019i jepej nj\u00eb fund formal Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore dhe se duheshin njohur dy Gjermani t\u00eb ndara. N\u00ebse aleat\u00ebt nuk mund t\u00eb binin dakord me nj\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb till\u00eb, Bashkimi Sovjetik do t\u00eb vepronte n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebanshme dhe do t\u00eb firmoste nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje paqeje me Gjermanin\u00eb Lindore. Kjo do t\u00eb thoshte fund i gjendjes s\u00eb luft\u00ebs q\u00eb ekzistonte gjith\u00ebsesi n\u00eb let\u00ebr, duke abroguar n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb ato angazhime q\u00eb buronin nga termat e dor\u00ebzimit t\u00eb gjerman\u00ebve \u2013 p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb t\u00eb drejtat e pushtimit, aksesin n\u00eb Berlinin Per\u00ebndimor si dhe p\u00ebrdorimin e korridor\u00ebve tok\u00ebsor\u00eb p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Gjermanis\u00eb Lindore. Kenedi u p\u00ebrgjigj se Berlini ishte nj\u00eb prej shqet\u00ebsimeve kryesor\u00eb t\u00eb SHBA, si dhe nj\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje shum\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme e siguris\u00eb komb\u00ebtare. Humbja e t\u00eb drejt\u00ebs s\u00eb aksesit do t\u00eb vinte n\u00eb pik\u00ebpyetje angazhimet e SHBA kudo, si dhe do t\u2019u jepte fund shpresave p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ribashkim t\u00eb dy Gjermanive.<\/p>\n
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Acarim<\/p>\n
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Toni n\u00eb samitin e Vien\u00ebs u ashp\u00ebrsua n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme, teksa acaroheshin pozicionet nga t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt. Berlini ishte b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb test ky\u00e7 i ekuilibrit t\u00eb fuqive, si dhe nj\u00eb betej\u00eb vullnetesh nd\u00ebrmjet dy lider\u00ebve t\u00eb vet\u00eb superfuqive. Konferenca u nd\u00ebrpre me nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb frik\u00ebsuese. Hrushev p\u00ebrs\u00ebriti k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrimin e tij, se cdo c\u00ebnim i integritetit t\u00eb Gjermanis\u00eb Lindore do t\u00eb shkaktonte nj\u00eb reagim nga ana e sovjetik\u00ebve dhe Kenedi rideklaroi se SHBA nuk do t\u00eb hiqte dor\u00eb nga e drejta e aksesit n\u00eb Berlin, duke shtuar \u201cse do t\u00eb jet\u00eb nj\u00eb dim\u00ebr i ftoht\u00eb\u201d.<\/p>\n
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Por, ajo ver\u00eb rezultoi nj\u00eb prej m\u00eb t\u00eb nxehtave n\u00eb sag\u00ebn e Berlinit. N\u00eb 15 qershor, Bashkimi Sovjetik nxorri nj\u00eb aid-memoire, i cili p\u00ebrmbante nj\u00eb ultimatum, se SHBA duhej t\u00eb pranonte k\u00ebrkesat e BS, ose ky do t\u00eb vepronte brenda fundit t\u00eb vitit. Kulmi u arrit n\u00eb 13 gusht, p\u00ebr befasin\u00eb e lider\u00ebve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb, kur gjermano-lindor\u00ebt nis\u00ebn krejt papritur t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtojn\u00eb, at\u00eb q\u00eb do t\u00eb shnd\u00ebrrohej n\u00eb nj\u00eb prej simboleve m\u00eb t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm t\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, Murin e Berlinit. N\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb, arsyet e ngritjes s\u00eb k\u00ebsaj pengese masive ishin t\u00eb paqarta. Lindja kish patur prej koh\u00ebsh nj\u00eb problem me v\u00ebrshimin e refugjat\u00ebve dhe t\u00eb arratisurve q\u00eb p\u00ebrpiqeshin t\u00eb kalonin nga nj\u00ebra pjes\u00eb e qytetit n\u00eb tjetr\u00ebn, por shpejt\u00ebsia dhe fsheht\u00ebsia me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn u ngrit muri, shkaktoi shtangie n\u00eb Uashington. N\u00eb mos p\u00ebr t\u00eb tjerat, kjo shkaktonte ndarje t\u00eb familjeve dhe miqve si dhe mbyllje t\u00eb atyre q\u00eb mbeteshin n\u00eb Berlinin lindor, duke i ndar\u00eb nga bashkatdhetar\u00ebt e lir\u00eb, n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn per\u00ebndimore. Gjithashtu, ofronte nj\u00eb prov\u00eb konkrete se Bashkimi Sovjetik kish p\u00ebr synim t\u00eb \u201cvuloste\u201d nj\u00eb her\u00eb e p\u00ebrgjithmon\u00eb Gjermanin\u00eb Lindore.<\/p>\n
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Trupa<\/p>\n
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Q\u00eb nga qershori, t\u00eb dy pal\u00ebt kishin rritur s\u00eb tep\u00ebrmi nivelin e p\u00ebrgatitjes ushtarake dhe Kenedi autorizoi menj\u00ebher\u00eb instalimin e 150 mij\u00eb trupave n\u00eb Berlinin per\u00ebndimor. Ai d\u00ebrgoi gjithashtu zv.presidentin Lindon Xhonson dhe Gjeneralin Lusius Klei n\u00eb qytet, p\u00ebr t\u00eb demonstruar vendosm\u00ebrin\u00eb e amerikan\u00ebve, si dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar edhe nj\u00eb her\u00eb per\u00ebndimor\u00ebt se SHBA nuk do t\u2019i braktiste. Muajt q\u00eb pasuan kishin tension t\u00eb lart\u00eb, me nj\u00eb num\u00ebr karshill\u00ebqesh, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb nj\u00eb moment kur tanket amerikan\u00eb dhe ata rus\u00eb q\u00ebndronin p\u00ebrball\u00eb nj\u00ebri-tjetrit n\u00eb nj\u00eb loj\u00eb t\u00eb rrezikshme me zjarrin. Sipas d\u00ebshmis\u00eb s\u00eb k\u00ebshilltar\u00ebve t\u00eb tij m\u00eb t\u00eb ngusht\u00eb, presidenti amerikan pyeste hapur se kur do t\u00eb vinte \u201cmomenti i s\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00ebs\u201d, por katastrofa finale nuk u materializua asnj\u00ebher\u00eb. Ultimatumi i dhjetorit, q\u00eb i ishte v\u00ebn\u00eb amerikan\u00ebve kaloi dhe BS nuk firmosi asnj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje me Gjermanin\u00eb Lindore, si dhe nuk iu mohua askujt aksesi n\u00eb Berlinin per\u00ebndimor. Ndjesia e kriz\u00ebs u zbeh, duke l\u00ebn\u00eb pas nj\u00eb situat\u00eb pezull e t\u00eb pasigurt\u00eb mes dy superfuqive.<\/p>\n
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P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb vitit 1961-shit dhe 1962-shit, Berlini mbeti pika qendrore e korrespondenc\u00ebs mes Hrushovit dhe Kenedit, ku BRSS vazhdimisht testonte q\u00ebllimet e amerikan\u00ebve. Por, tetori i atij viti pa shp\u00ebrthimin e nj\u00eb krize edhe m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe, nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb q\u00eb i coi dy superfuqit\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonisht shum\u00eb pran\u00eb konfrontimit b\u00ebrthamor.<\/p>\n
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Kuba kish qen\u00eb nj\u00eb problem goxha i lodhsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr SHBA q\u00eb nga viti 1959, kur komunisti Fidel Kastro kish ardhur n\u00eb pushtet. Kenedi kish p\u00ebrjetuar tashm\u00eb nj\u00eb sprapsje posht\u00ebruese kur pati d\u00ebshtuar t\u00eb rr\u00ebzonte Kastron, n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen e Gjirit t\u00eb Derrave, q\u00eb u mb\u00ebshtet nga amerikan\u00ebt n\u00eb prill 1961. M\u00eb von\u00eb at\u00eb vit, ai autorizoi nj\u00eb program veprimesh t\u00eb fsheht\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb destabilizuar regjimin, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb disa skema p\u00ebr t\u00eb vrar\u00eb Kastron. K\u00ebshtu q\u00eb, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb habi q\u00eb lideri kuban t\u2019i druhej nj\u00eb pushtimi t\u00eb dyt\u00eb t\u00eb udh\u00ebhequr nga amerikan\u00ebt, dhe t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonte mb\u00ebshtetjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik, kund\u00ebr q\u00ebllimeve t\u00eb imperializmit amerikan.<\/p>\n
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Hrushovi<\/p>\n
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Edhe Hrushovi kishte problemet e tij. Ai jo vet\u00ebm kish d\u00ebshtuar t\u00eb sillte t\u00ebrheqjen e amerikan\u00ebve nga Berlini, por raportet e sh\u00ebrbimit t\u00eb fsheht\u00eb amerikan n\u00eb 1961 dhe 1962 kishin bindur m\u00eb n\u00eb fund lider\u00ebt politik\u00eb t\u00eb SHBA, se \u201chendeku i raketave\u201d p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin trembeshin aq shum\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb iluzion; aft\u00ebsia b\u00ebrthamore sovjetike, q\u00eb mendohej se ishte superiore, ishte n\u00eb fakt shum\u00eb inferiore kundrejt asaj t\u00eb SHBA. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebtyre, Hrushovin e mundonte fakti q\u00eb SHBA mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtonte nj\u00eb gardh p\u00ebrrrth Bashkimit Sovjetik me baza ushtarake amerikane, si dhe t\u00eb vendoste raketa \u201cJupiter\u201d n\u00eb Turqi, mu n\u00eb kufi me BS-n\u00eb. Gjat\u00eb pranver\u00ebs dhe ver\u00ebs s\u00eb 1962-shit, u vendos q\u00eb nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kompensuar superioritetin b\u00ebrthamor amerikan, p\u00ebr t\u00eb ushtruar trysni mbi SHBA-t\u00eb n\u00eb lidhje me Berlinin dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndihmuar Kub\u00ebn, do t\u00eb ishte vendosja e raketave sovjetike me rreze t\u00eb mesme, n\u00eb tok\u00eb kubaneze. Porosit\u00eb formale u d\u00ebrguan n\u00eb Ministrin\u00eb e Mbrojtjes dhe instalimi nisi n\u00eb 10 qershor 1962.<\/p>\n
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N\u00eb fund t\u00eb gushtit, avion\u00eb amerikan\u00eb t\u00eb zbulimit pikas\u00ebn nd\u00ebrtimin e raketave n\u00eb Kub\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, t\u00eb shqet\u00ebsuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb me p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsimin e situat\u00ebs n\u00eb Evrop\u00eb dhe Azin\u00eb Juglindore, administrata b\u00ebri supozimin e gabuar se q\u00ebllimi i k\u00ebtyre bazave ishte forcimi i mbrojtjes kubaneze. Misionet e zbulimit u shtuan n\u00eb shtator, por cudit\u00ebrisht nuk u zbuluan prova t\u00eb reja, p\u00ebr t\u00eb bindur Kenedin se bazat ishin m\u00eb shum\u00eb se p\u00ebr mbrojtje. Ky gjykim u p\u00ebrforcua edhe nga fakti q\u00eb asnj\u00ebher\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb, Bashkimi Sovjetik nuk kish vendosur raketa n\u00eb tok\u00eb t\u00eb huaj, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb sinjalet nga pala sovjetike inkurajonin iden\u00eb se BS nuk kish nd\u00ebrmend ta b\u00ebnte k\u00ebt\u00eb gj\u00eb. N\u00eb 11 shtator, agjencia sovjetike e lajmeve, TASS b\u00ebnte t\u00eb ditur: \u201cNuk ka nevoj\u00eb q\u00eb Bashkimi Sovjetik t\u00eb zhvendos\u00eb arm\u00ebt e veta p\u00ebr t\u00eb frenuar agresor\u00ebt\u2026 n\u00eb ndonj\u00eb vend tjet\u00ebr, p\u00ebr shembull n\u00eb Kub\u00eb\u201d.<\/p>\n
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Siguri<\/p>\n
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Sinjale t\u00eb till\u00eb u p\u00ebrforcuan m\u00eb tej n\u00eb nivelet m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb diploamtik\u00eb. N\u00eb 4 shtator, dhe s\u00ebrish n\u00eb 6 shtator, ambasadori sovjetik n\u00eb SHBA, Anatoli Dobrinin thirri Kryeprokurorin e SHBA, Bob Kenedi, v\u00ebllai i Presidentit Xhon, duke i th\u00ebn\u00eb se kish mesazhe personale nga Hrushovi. Thelbi i k\u00ebtyre mesazheve ishte se Bashkimi Sovjetik nuk kish p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim t\u00eb krijonte telashe me SHBA p\u00ebrpara zgjedhjeve t\u00eb ardhshme n\u00eb kongres, dhe se nuk do t\u00eb kryhej asnj\u00eb veprim q\u00eb \u201cdo t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikonte situat\u00ebn nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, apo acaronte edhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet mes dy vendeve tona\u201d. Megjith\u00ebse p\u00ebrgjigja e Kenedit ndaj Hrushovit ishte se SHBA nuk do t\u00eb toleronte raketat ruse n\u00eb Kub\u00eb, ishte e qart\u00eb se deri tani strategjia sovjetike po funksiononte dhe se SHBA mbeteshin t\u00eb pavet\u00ebdijshme p\u00ebr p\u00ebrmas\u00ebn e aventur\u00ebs b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Hrushovit.<\/p>\n
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Kriza shp\u00ebrtheu n\u00eb 15 tetor, kur Kenedit iu dhan\u00eb prova fotografike t\u00eb nj\u00eb misioni zbulimi, q\u00eb ofronin versionin e pakund\u00ebrshtuesh\u00ebm se sovjetik\u00ebt po nd\u00ebrtonin vende p\u00ebr vendosjen e raketave b\u00ebrthamore, vet\u00ebm 90 milje larg Majemit. K\u00ebshilltar\u00ebt e tij m\u00eb t\u00eb ngusht\u00eb thon\u00eb se Kenedi shp\u00ebrtheu menj\u00ebher\u00eb n\u00eb zem\u00ebrim: \u201cSi mund t\u00eb ma b\u00ebj\u00eb ai k\u00ebt\u00eb mua!\u201d Presidenti mblodhi nj\u00eb ekip me 15 k\u00ebshilltar\u00ebt m\u00eb t\u00eb ngusht\u00eb. I njohur si Komiteti Ekzekutiv i K\u00ebshillit Komb\u00ebtar t\u00eb Siguris\u00eb (ExComm), ky grup funksiononte si k\u00ebshilli m\u00eb i ngusht\u00eb i siguris\u00eb komb\u00ebtare, p\u00ebr 13 dit\u00ebt q\u00eb pasuan.<\/p>\n
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Gjasht\u00eb alternativa<\/p>\n
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Detyra e par\u00eb e Exxcomm-it ishte t\u00eb ekzaminonte opsionet q\u00eb SHBA kish n\u00eb dispozicion. U sugjeruan gjasht\u00eb alternativa, q\u00eb varionin nga mosveprimi i plot\u00eb e deri tek pushtimi total i Kub\u00ebs. Megjithat\u00eb, shum\u00eb shpejt strategjia amerikane u reduktua n\u00eb dy reagime kryesore: ose nj\u00eb sulm ajror kirurgjik ndaj bazave, ose nj\u00eb bllokad\u00eb e ishullit. Opsioni i sulmit ajror pasohej nga nj\u00eb mori problemesh, aq m\u00eb tep\u00ebr q\u00eb ushtria nuk garantonte se ai do t\u00eb ishte tamam kirurgjik. Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb vendet ku ndodheshin raketat mund t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrroheshin, forca ajrore nuk mund t\u00eb ish e sigurt\u00eb, se MIG-\u00ebt sovjetike dhe bombarduesit \u201cIliushin\u201d t\u00eb vendosur n\u00eb Kub\u00eb o t\u00eb mund t\u00eb parandaloheshin q\u00eb t\u00eb mos nisnin sulme ndaj tok\u00ebs amerikane. Gjithashtu, nuk mund t\u00eb ish e sigurt\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha do t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrroheshin n\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion t\u00eb vog\u00ebl. Me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb t\u00eb garantonin shkat\u00ebrrimin e plot\u00eb t\u00eb bazave duheshin 500 sulme t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm: me fjal\u00eb t\u00eb tjera, nj\u00eb sulm masiv dhe jo kirurgjik, q\u00eb rrezikonte t\u00eb shaktonte deri 20 mij\u00eb t\u00eb vdekur nga personeli rus, apo civil\u00eb vendas. N\u00eb fakt, numri i rus\u00ebve q\u00eb ndodheshin n\u00eb Kub\u00eb p\u00ebr q\u00ebllime ushtarake ishte n\u00ebnvler\u00ebsuar shum\u00eb; shifra m\u00eb t\u00eb vona tregojn\u00eb se ndodheshi deri 42 mij\u00eb vet\u00eb, personel ushtarak rus n\u00eb ishull. Sigurisht, Moska nuk do ta injoronte nj\u00eb sulm t\u00eb till\u00eb. Gjithashtu, sulmi do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb ndodhte pa paralajm\u00ebrim, gj\u00eb q\u00eb, p\u00ebr nj\u00eb vend i cili e kish provuar vet\u00eb n\u00eb kurriz k\u00ebt\u00eb gj\u00eb me Pearl Harbori e famsh\u00ebm, do t\u00eb qe e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb kap\u00ebrdihej.<\/p>\n
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Bllokada<\/p>\n
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Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb diskutimet vazhdonin, opsioni i bllokad\u00ebs po b\u00ebhej gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb i pranuesh\u00ebm. Ai do t\u00eb ndalonte cdo vendosje raketash t\u00eb reja nga sovjetik\u00ebt, do t\u00eb sinjalizonte angazhimin e amerikan\u00ebve p\u00ebr largimin e raketave dhe do ia kalonte barr\u00ebn e l\u00ebvizjes s\u00eb radh\u00ebs, ekskluzivisht Hrushovit. Kenedi i shpalli q\u00ebllimet e tij n\u00eb 22 tetor. Presidenti deklaroi para publikut se ishte zbuluar prania e raketave sovjetike n\u00eb Kub\u00eb, duke shpallur q\u00ebllimin e tij p\u00ebr \u201ct\u00eb vendosur nj\u00eb karantin\u00eb ndaj t\u00eb gjith\u00eb pajisjeve ushtarake ofensive q\u00eb do t\u00eb shkonin p\u00ebr n\u00eb Kub\u00eb\u201d, dhe q\u00eb do t\u00eb hynte n\u00eb fuqi n\u00eb 24 tetor. N\u00ebse ndonj\u00eb anije sovjetike i rezistonte urdh\u00ebrave p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndalur, anijet amerikane do t\u00eb q\u00ebllonin kund\u00ebr tyre. Ai deklaroi gjithashtu se cdo raket\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore q\u00eb do t\u00eb l\u00ebshohej nga Kuba, do t\u00eb konsiderohej si nj\u00eb sulm ndaj SHBA prej Bashkimit Sovjetik, si dhe k\u00ebrkoi q\u00eb BRSS t\u00eb largonte t\u00eb gjith\u00eb arm\u00ebt b\u00ebrthamore nga Kuba.<\/p>\n
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N\u00eb dit\u00ebt q\u00eb pasuan, u rrit numri i fluturimeve t\u00eb avion\u00ebve t\u00eb zbulimit mbi Kub\u00eb, duke arritur nj\u00eb shpesht\u00ebsi cdo dy or\u00eb dhe anijet sovjetike, me m\u00eb shum\u00eb njer\u00ebz dhe materiale, lundronin shum\u00eb m\u00eb pran\u00eb ishullit. N\u00eb dat\u00ebn 25, Kenedi rriti nivelin e gatishm\u00ebris\u00eb ushtarake \u2013 tashm\u00eb, lufta ishte nj\u00eb hap larg. U duk se dy superfuqit\u00eb ishin tashm\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb rrug\u00eb p\u00ebrplasjeje. Megjithat\u00eb, n\u00eb 26 tetor, nj\u00eb let\u00ebr e fsheht\u00eb dhe plot pasion erdhi prej Hrushovit, n\u00eb adres\u00eb t\u00eb Kenedit. Kryeministri sovjetik shkruante: \u201cN\u00ebse nuk ke humbur vet\u00ebkontrollin dhe e kupton se ku mund t\u00eb na coj\u00eb kjo, at\u00ebher\u00eb, Z. President, ne dhe ju duhet t\u00eb t\u00ebrheqim tashm\u00eb fundet tan\u00eb t\u00eb litarit, n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin ti ke lidhur nyj\u00ebn e luft\u00ebs, pasi, sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00ebrheqim, aq m\u00eb shum\u00eb do t\u00eb shtr\u00ebngohet nyja.<\/p>\n
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Ajo cfar\u00eb propozoi Hrushovi ishte nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje, n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn Bashkimi Sovjetik do t\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqte t\u00eb gjith\u00eb raketat nga Kuba, n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb nj\u00eb garancie prej amerikan\u00ebve se nuk do t\u00eb pushtonin ishullin.<\/p>\n
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Por dita m\u00eb e keqe e kriz\u00ebs ende nuk kishte ardhur. N\u00eb 27 tetor, teksa ExComm-i po p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb hartonte nj\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigje ndaj letr\u00ebs s\u00eb kryeministrit sovjetik, Radio Moska nisi t\u00eb transmetoj\u00eb nj\u00eb let\u00ebr t\u00eb dyt\u00eb t\u00eb Hrushovit drejtuar Kenedit. Ky mesazh ishte shum\u00eb m\u00eb i ashp\u00ebr, dhe n\u00eb t\u00eb thuhej se heqja raketave sovjetike nga Kuba do t\u00eb varej nga heqja e raketave b\u00ebrthamore amerikane nga Turqia. Krejt papritur, Hrushovi kish rritur stek\u00ebn. Problemet e ExComm-it u shtuan edhe m\u00eb kur u informua se nj\u00eb avion zbulimi amerikan ishte goditur dhe rr\u00ebzuar teksa fluturonte mbi Kub\u00eb. Kenedi iu drejtua an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb Komisionit: \u201cTani, mund t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb cdo gj\u00eb\u201d. Gjat\u00eb gjith\u00eb k\u00ebsaj kohe, marina sovjetike po i afrohej gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb vij\u00ebs s\u00eb bllokad\u00ebs, duke rritur k\u00ebshtu gjasat p\u00ebr nj\u00eb konfrontim ushtarak.<\/p>\n
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Koha po mbaronte. Gjat\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb dit\u00ebs, ExComm-i k\u00ebrkoi nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur kriz\u00ebn politikisht, pa p\u00ebrdorur forc\u00ebn e arm\u00ebve. N\u00eb pasdite, m\u00eb n\u00eb fund Robert Kenedi parashtroi nj\u00eb plan, jo pa risk. Ai sugjeroi q\u00eb presidenti t\u00eb injoroj\u00eb letr\u00ebn e dyt\u00eb dhe t\u00eb kontaktoj\u00eb Anatoli Dobrininin, t\u00eb cilit t\u2019i thot\u00eb se SHBA \u00ebsht\u00eb dakord me mesazhin e par\u00eb t\u00eb Hrushovit. Kenedi firmosi nj\u00eb let\u00ebr ku theksonte se binte dakord me propozimet e Hrushovit, por n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn p\u00ebrfshinte edhe nj\u00eb paralajm\u00ebrim se vazhdimi i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit do t\u00eb ishte \u201cnj\u00eb rrezik i madh p\u00ebr paqen n\u00eb bot\u00eb\u201d. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, karantina ishte vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb hap i par\u00eb dhe opsioni i sulmit ajror ishte i gatsh\u00ebm brenda 48 or\u00ebve, n\u00ebse sovjetik\u00ebt do t\u00eb vazhdonin t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtonin baza.<\/p>\n
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P\u00ebrgjigja erdhi dit\u00ebn tjet\u00ebr. N\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigje t\u00eb letr\u00ebs s\u00eb Kenedit, Radio Moska transmetoi nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb t\u00eb Hrushovit. N\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb garancive t\u00eb amerikan\u00ebve p\u00ebr Kub\u00ebn, qeveria sovjetike \u201cka dh\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb urdh\u00ebr t\u00eb ri p\u00ebr t\u00eb cmontuar arm\u00ebt q\u00eb ju i p\u00ebrshkruani si sulmuese \u2026 dhe t\u2019i rikthej\u00eb ato n\u00eb Bashkimin Sovjetik\u201d. Ndon\u00ebse p\u00ebr cmontimin do t\u00eb duhej disa koh\u00eb, dhe pavar\u00ebsisht v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsive t\u00eb vazhdueshme t\u00eb SHBA me regjimin e Kastros, kriza e Kub\u00ebs kish marr\u00eb fund.<\/p>\n
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Nj\u00eb trash\u00ebgimi dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse n\u00eb menaxhimin e krizave, q\u00eb cudit\u00ebrisht \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e leht\u00eb t\u00eb mos vihet re, \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe fakti q\u00eb un\u00eb jam gjall\u00eb ta shkruaj k\u00ebt\u00eb artikull dhe ju jeni gjall\u00eb ta lexoni. Nuk mund t\u00eb n\u00ebnvler\u00ebsohet se me cfar\u00eb luanin BRSS dhe SHBA gjat\u00eb k\u00ebsaj periudhe.<\/p>\n
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M\u00ebnyra se si lider\u00ebt amerikan\u00eb dhe sovjetik\u00eb p\u00ebrballuan k\u00ebt\u00eb rrezik q\u00ebndron n\u00eb thelb t\u00eb konceptit t\u00eb menaxhimit efektiv t\u00eb krizave nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Gjat\u00eb t\u00eb dy krizave, Kenedi n\u00eb m\u00ebyr\u00eb t\u00eb vecant\u00eb u p\u00ebrball me zgjedhje shum\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtira. Kur u rikthye nga samiti i Vien\u00ebs n\u00eb 1961, ai rishikoi planet e NATO-s n\u00eb lidhje me Berlinin Per\u00ebndimor. P\u00ebr befasin\u00eb e tij, planet k\u00ebrkonin q\u00eb karvan\u00eb t\u00eb armatosur t\u00eb udh\u00ebtonin p\u00ebrmes Gjermanis\u00eb Lindore p\u00ebr t\u00eb cliruar qytetin. N\u00ebse do t\u00eb hasnin n\u00eb rezistenc\u00eb, planifikuesit parashikonin nj\u00eb acarim t\u00eb luft\u00ebs b\u00ebrthamore. Plane t\u00eb tilla, praktikisht nuk i jepnin presidentit asnj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb p\u00ebr manovrime. N\u00eb vend t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj, ai u p\u00ebrpoq t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtoj\u00eb nj\u00eb mas\u00eb fleksibiliteti, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb demonstronte anagzhim nga nj\u00ebra an\u00eb duke zgjeruar opsionet tradicional\u00eb. Kjo do t\u00eb thoshte trefishimin e thirrjes s\u00eb ushtar\u00ebve, mobilizimin e 250 mij\u00eb rezervist\u00ebve dhe Gard\u00ebs Kombtare, mobilizimin e dy divizioneve t\u00eb plot\u00eb t\u00eb SHBA, si dhe 54 skuadroneve ajror\u00eb dhe t\u00eb marin\u00ebs, me nj\u00eb kosto totale prej 3.2 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00ebsh.<\/p>\n
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I nj\u00ebjti mendim motivoi Kenedin edhe gjat\u00eb kriz\u00ebs s\u00eb Kub\u00ebs. Pushtimi i plot\u00eb i ishullit u p\u00ebrjashtua me shpejt\u00ebsi dhe opsioni i sulmit ajror zuri vend, teksa presidenti p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb gjente nj\u00eb rrug\u00eb t\u00eb mesme, duke vendosur nj\u00eb \u201ckarantin\u00eb\u201d mbi Kub\u00ebn. Ashtu si n\u00eb Berlin, kjo binte ndesh me planet e specialist\u00ebve ushtarak\u00eb. An\u00ebtar\u00ebt civil\u00eb t\u00eb ExComm-it u habit\u00ebn q\u00eb homolog\u00ebt e trye ushtarak\u00eb merrnin kaq pak n\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb pasojat e veprimeve q\u00eb mbronin. N\u00eb dit\u00ebt e fundit t\u00eb kriz\u00ebs, Presidenti thoshte: \u201cNj\u00eb pushtim do t\u00eb kish qen\u00eb nj\u00eb gabim i madh \u2013 nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim i gabuar i fuqis\u00eb son\u00eb. Por ata t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb marr\u00eb. Ata donin ta b\u00ebnin. Jemi me fat q\u00eb kemi Sekretarin e Mbrojtjes, MekNamara atje\u201d.<\/p>\n
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N\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb, n\u00eb 28 tetor, dit\u00ebn kur kriza u duk se p\u00ebrfundoi, Gjenerali K\u00ebrtis L\u00ebMej, Shefi i Stabit i Forcave Ajrore i sugjeroi presidentit q\u00eb \u201csido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, ne t\u00eb sulmojm\u00eb t\u00eb h\u00ebn\u00ebn\u201d. Nevoja p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur k\u00ebta konflikte pa p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs nuk duhet t\u00eb ngat\u00ebrrohet me zbutjen. Vendim-marr\u00ebsit e superfuqive duhej t\u00eb moderonin shkall\u00ebn e konkurrenc\u00ebs, p\u00ebr arsye se acarimi i pakontrolluar rrezikonte t\u00eb shkaktonte sulme t\u00eb m\u00ebdha nd\u00ebshkuese b\u00ebrthamore kund\u00ebr vendeve respektiv\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, kur nuk angazhoheshin n\u00eb konfliktin (pothuajse) b\u00ebrthamor, vendim-marr\u00ebsit n\u00eb SHBA dhe BRSS nuk ishin kund\u00ebr angazhimit n\u00eb politika lufte, sic tregojn\u00eb lufta n\u00eb Vietnam, apo dhe pushtimi i Afganistanit nga rus\u00ebt n\u00eb 1979.<\/p>\n
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Vec k\u00ebsaj, t\u00eb shiheshe si i dor\u00ebzuar p\u00ebrpara kund\u00ebrshtarit ishte gjithashtu e patolerueshme dhe problematike. Nj\u00eb ironi e kriz\u00ebs kubane \u00ebsht\u00eb se Kenedi kishte udh\u00ebzuar ushtrin\u00eb n\u00eb gusht 1962, q\u00eb t\u00eb largonte raketat b\u00ebrthamore \u201cJupiter\u201d nga Turqia, por kjo nuk ishte b\u00ebr\u00eb. K\u00ebshtu q\u00eb, ai ishte dyfish i tronditur kur zubloi n\u00eb 27 tetor 1962, q\u00eb jo vet\u00ebm dikush nuk kishte zbatur urdh\u00ebrat q\u00eb ai kish dh\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb hequr raketat, por tani ato ishin edhe nj\u00eb komponent kryesor n\u00eb nj\u00eb loj\u00eb vdekjeprur\u00ebse, t\u00eb maces me miun. Tani, ai nuk mund t\u2019i largonte ato publikisht, p\u00ebr arsye se kjo do t\u00eb shihej si shenj\u00eb frik\u00ebsimi p\u00ebrpara shantazhit b\u00ebrthamor sovjetik.<\/p>\n
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Berlini dhe Kuba u demonstruan lider\u00ebve sovjetik\u00eb dhe amerikan\u00eb se duhej rimenduar strategjia e p\u00ebrmbajtjes. Srategjia e Shkat\u00ebrrimit t\u00eb Nd\u00ebrsjell\u00eb t\u00eb Garantuar q\u00eb udh\u00ebhiqte m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn se si arm\u00ebt b\u00ebrthamore do t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoreshin, ndihmonte shum\u00eb pak superfuqit\u00eb e mb\u00ebrthyera n\u00eb konfrontim. Nj\u00eb pasoj\u00eb e menj\u00ebhershme e ngjarjeve t\u00eb 1961 dhe 1962 ishte nj\u00eb rivler\u00ebsim i p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtyre arm\u00ebve dhe nisi t\u00eb shfaqet nj\u00eb interes i madh p\u00ebr hartimin e nj\u00eb \u201creagimi fleksib\u00ebl\u201d, q\u00eb parashikonte p\u00ebrdorimin e arm\u00ebve taktike t\u00eb fush\u00ebbetej\u00ebs, n\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb kufizuar. Fatmir\u00ebsisht, edhe k\u00ebto qasje m\u00eb t\u00eb limituara nuk u testuan asnj\u00ebher\u00eb gjat\u00eb konfrontimeve, si kriza e Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme e vitit 1973.<\/p>\n
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M\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishmja, nga kriza u kuptua se konkurenca SHBA-BS duhej t\u00eb vihej n\u00ebn kontroll. Nj\u00eb leksion shokues nga kriza ishte se, n\u00eb nj\u00eb epok\u00eb t\u00eb telekomunikacioneve, raketave balistike nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare dhe eksplorimit t\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00ebs, nuk kishte mjete komunikimi t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb mes Uashingtonit dhe Mosk\u00ebs. Hrushovit i sh\u00ebrbente Radio Moska p\u00ebr t\u2019i p\u00ebrcjell\u00eb mesazhe Kenedit dhe komunikimi dplomatik b\u00ebhej ende me mesazhe t\u00eb shkruar tek ambasador\u00ebt, q\u00eb sh\u00ebrbenin si nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebs. Si rrjedhim, pas Kub\u00ebs, Uashingtoni dhe Moska krijuan t\u00eb famshmen \u201clinj\u00eb e nxeht\u00eb\u201d. Megjithat\u00eb, edhe kjo m\u00ebnyr\u00eb komunikimi direkt b\u00ebhej me teleprinter, dhe jo drejp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb.<\/p>\n
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T\u00eb tjera kontrolle pasuan. P\u00ebrvoja e k\u00ebtyre krizave, kur bota iu afrua m\u00eb shum\u00eb se asnj\u00ebher\u00eb luft\u00ebs b\u00ebrthamore, shkaktoi nj\u00eb rinovim t\u00eb diplomacis\u00eb s\u00eb superfuqive dhe fundi i viteve \u201960 pa firmosjen e nj\u00eb numri traktatesh q\u00eb p\u00ebrpiqeshin t\u2019i vendosnin limite shkall\u00ebs s\u00eb konkurenc\u00ebs b\u00ebrthamore. K\u00ebta p\u00ebrfshinin: Traktati i Ndalimit t\u00eb Pjessh\u00ebm t\u00eb Testeve b\u00ebrthamore i 1963, Ndalimi i Arm\u00ebve B\u00ebrthamore n\u00eb Hap\u00ebsir\u00eb i 1967 dhe firmosja e Traktatit t\u00eb Mosp\u00ebrhapjes B\u00ebrthamore n\u00eb 1968.<\/p>\n
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Kriza shkaktoi edhe nj\u00eb miratim t\u00eb heshtur se, secila superfuqi kishte \u201csfer\u00ebn e vet t\u00eb influenc\u00ebs\u201d. P\u00ebr pjes\u00ebn e mbetur t\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, BRSS-s\u00eb iu la pak a shum\u00eb dor\u00eb e lir\u00eb n\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn Lindore. Berlini Per\u00ebndimor mbeti nj\u00eb enklav\u00eb per\u00ebndimore dhe Evropa Per\u00ebndimore u pranua si pjes\u00eb e sistemit Atlantik t\u00eb siguris\u00eb.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Statusi i Berlinit kish qen\u00eb nj\u00eb problem i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb p\u00ebr Aleat\u00ebt, q\u00eb nga koha e konferencave t\u00eb Jalt\u00ebs dhe Potsdamit n\u00eb 1945, at\u00ebher\u00eb kur \u201cTre…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":29673,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[35],"tags":[485,486],"class_list":["post-29672","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dossier","tag-dy-kriza-berlini-dhe-kuba","tag-perplasjet-e-medha-te-luftes-se-ftohte-nga-jim-broderick","wpcat-35-id"],"yoast_head":"\n